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COVERED INTEREST PARITY, UNCOVERFD INTEREST
PARITY, AND EXCHANGE RATE DYNAMICS*

ABSTR.l\.CT

A nur.:.ber of nacroeconomic models of open economies under

flexible exchange rate assUJI1e a strong version of perfect capital
mobi 1 i ty \,hich ir.,plies that currency speculation coranands no risk
pre:niur;i.

If this assumption is dropped a m..1J-;iber of important

results no longer obtain.

First, the exchange rate and interest rate

cannot be in steady state unless both the government deficit and
current account equal zero, not sir.iply their slilTI.

Second, even in

steady state the domestic interest rate can deviate from the foreign
interest rate by an amount that depends upon relative domestic asset
supplies.

.

Finally, introducing risk aversion on the part of speculators

reduces the response on impact of the exchange rate to changes in domestic
asset supplies.

In this sense rational speculators, if they are less

risk averse than other agents, can a.estahilize exchange r.iarkets.

*

He wish to thank Gene M. Grossman for some helpful comments on this
paper.
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I.

INTRODUCTION A.i\JD su~~1.\RY

The advent of floating rates among the major currencies has led to
the development of increasingl y sophisticat ed models of open economies in
which exchange rates are market determined.

As was pointed out in the early

work of Fleming (1962) and Mundell (1963) the degree of internation al capital
mobility is crucial in determining the response of an economy to both monetary
And while the Fleming-Mun dell analysis is based on the

and fiscal actions.

traditional static short-run model, the i~portance of the degree of capital
Dobility applies to the long-run response as well.
Perhaps because capital does seem to be very mobile among the major
industrial countries, the polar assumption of perfect capital mobility has
received most attention.
ways, however.

This assumption may be interpreted in two different

The first, weaker

version is that bonds which are free of

default risk domesticall y are also free of default risk abroad;
(1973) tenninology , there is no 'political' risk.

in Aliber's

When capital mobility of

this degree obtains, foreign bonds on which forward cover has been obtained
are perfect substitutes for domestic bonds and arbitrage brings the domestic
interest rate (R) into equality with the foreign interest rate (R*) plus the
fon,ard premium on foreign exchange (F).

Thus coverec interest parity (CIP)

obtains
R = R*

(1.1)

+ F

\-.'here R, R* and F are defined over the same time interval.

In fact, empirical

evidence suggests that among the major industrial nations, deviations from
are not significant ;

CIP

see e.g. Aliber (1973), Frenkel and Levich (1975, 1977).

A stronger definition of capital mobility is one that adds to the
cri tcrion for the first the requirement that attib..n es ~m,·ards exchange risk be
characteriz ed by risk neutrality, either because thereqexist a sufficient
number of risk neutral speculators , or because exchange risk is perfectly
diversifiab fc.

In this case, speculation will bring the fon.. ar<l premium on

foreign exchange into equality with the expected rate of appreciatio n of the
foreign currency;

that is
•

F = (E/E)

C

(1. 2)

tic curren cy,
where E denote s the price of foreig n curren cy in terms of domes
and where for any variab le X, we define
expec tation of X.

X = dX/dt

and Xe denote s the

Subst itutin g (1.2) into (1.1) yields the condit ion
(1.3)

(UIP) and
a condi tion "·hi ch is referr ed to as uncove red intere st parity
which requir es both (1. 1) and (1. 2) to hold.

1

strong
Hm,ev er, the empir ical eviden ce in suppo rt of (1. 2) is not as
Levich (1978, Bilson (1978) and Hansen and Hodric k (1980)

as it is for (1.1).

long period s.
report so::-,e syster .iatic deYia tions for severa l exchan ge rates over
invest ment
These findin gs are consis tent with financ ial models of foreig n
specu lators \\·i 11
which sugge st that risk aversi on among ration al, fully inform ed
create a risk premium, thereb y causin g (1.2) to break dmm.
Kouri (1976) , Adler and Dumas (1977)

1

Solnik (1973) ,

Franke l (1979) and Eaton and Turnov sky

on ex--pected utilit y
(1980) deriye variou s expres sions for this premium based
maxim ization .
the
But despit e the lack of theore tical justif icatio n for UIP and
behav iour
empir ical eviden ce agains t it, most well-k nown result s about the
this strong er
of macroe conom ic models with perfec tly mobile capita l requir e
defin ition to apply.

This paper develo ps a model of a small open economy

foreig n exchan ge
under the more genera l assum ption that the fon~ar d pre~iu m on
is detere. ine<l by risk averse specu lative behav iour.

Capit al is still

l case of
perfe ctly r.:iobile in the weake r sense that CIP obtain s and a specia
zero, in which
our nodel is one in which the degree of risk aversi on tends to
case UIP applie s as well.

We use this model to examin e severa l propo sition s

ge rate.
about the bchJv iour of a small open economy with a flexib le exchan
These pertai n to:

the effect s of change s in domes tic asset suppli es and

tic intere st
foreig n intere st rate on the steady -state levels of the domes
its;
rate and exchan ge rate; the effect s of ongoin g govern ment defic

and the

dynamic behav iour of the exchan ge rate betwee n steady states .
In Sectio n 2 which follo\-.'S, we develo p a dynamic model of an open
premium arc
economy in 1-.-liich the exchan ge rate, intere st rate, and foTh·ard

.)

.

detennin ed at each instant by money market and forward market equilibr ium
conditio ns, togethe r with CIP.

At any moment, the price of nontrade d

goods and asset supplies are predeter mined, while we treat the foreign interes t
rate and price level as exogeno us.

Over time, the price of nontrade d

goods adjusts graduall y to the price of traded goods;

the supplie s of

domesti c assets change through the governm ent deficit, ¼"hile the balance of
payment s on current account detennin es the change in foreign asset supplie s.
With risk averse specula tive behavio ur, exchange rate and price dynamics
on the one hand, become inheren tly linked with asset supply dyna!ilics on the
other.

For the syste;n as a whole, and the exchange rate and interes t rate

in particu lar, to be in steady state, all asset accumul ation must cease and
for this to occur, both the budget deficit cmd

the balance of payment s on

current account must equal zero.
In the limiting case in which specula tors are risk neutral , the
conditio ns for the exchange rate and price level to attain steady state may
be relaxed .

For example, with a bond-fin anced governr:ient deficit , it is

necessa ry only for the budget deficit and current account surplus to swn to
zero.

Thus the exchange rate and price level can be in steady state even

if the governm ent deficit is perpetu ally unbalan ced, as long as it is offset
by an appropr iate imbalanc e on the current account,

If, in addition , asset

supplie s do not affect the demand for money, the exchange rate and the price
level evolve indepen dently of the governm ent deficit and the balance of
payment s on current account.

In this case, the exchange rate and price level car

2
be in steady state even if these t,rn quantit ies do not sum to zero.

These observa tions are of relevanc e to a number of recent studies of
exchang e rate dynamics (e.g. Dornbus ch (1976), Gray and Turnovsk y (1979a),
and \\'i Ison (1979)) who specify models of exchange rate and price dynamic s
in which do_mestic and foreign bond supplies play no explici t role.
exclusio n ·is legitima te only under the c~rong assumpt ion of UIP
al 1 these authors lilake).

Furtherm ore,

that under flexible rates a governm ent

This

(an assumpti on

~ell's (1963) finding
_Ci_

will not disturb the steady

4.

state exchange rate or interest rate (because its effect on the total bond
supply is offset by the current account) also requires UIP to hold.
In Section 3 we examine the properties of the steady state itself.
An

important aspect of the income detennination models of Mundell (1963)

and Fleming (1962) and of the exchange rate dynamics of Dornbusch (1976)
et

al. is that,in steady state, the domestic interest rate equals the

foreign interest rate and is independent of domestic asset supplies. 3

In

addition, the steady-state exchange rate and domestic price level are
homogeneous of degree one in the domestic money supply.

None of these

results is preserved v;hen speculators are risk averse.

Thus, even if CIP

obtains, the domestic interest rate can be affected by domestic policies
in steady state, so;:;ething that

is not possibleu:.der UIP.

Also, the

exchange rate and douestic price level are homogeneous of degree one, and
the interest rate homogeneous of degree zero, in the supplies of both domestic
assets taken together, and not just money. 4
Sections 4 and 5 exar.iine the transition between steady states, a
subject "'·hich has been receiving extensive treatment recently.

In Section

4 we show that once-and-for-a ll proportional increases in the supplies of

money and domestic bonds introduced simultaneously can, on impact, cause
either a s~aller than, or greater than; proportional response in the exchange
rate.

This result contrasts with the previous models

assumptions

in ~hich,under similar

but with UIP ~olding, the exchange rate necessarily 'overshoots'

its steady state value.

5

The change in the exchange rate on impact varies

inversely with the degree of risk aversion.

Our model thus suggests a sense

in which speculation (or more properly, less risk averse speculation) destc:OiZ-:za
exchange rates;

this is in the sense of increa ·ng their short-run

sensitivity to changes in domestic asset supplies.
In Section 5 \•:e consider the dynamic effects of once-and-for-z
lTI

t!.

fore i,

:sey supply alone.

Since this type of change affects the nw;.

:ids held in steady state, the dynamics are considerably mor.

complicatcc.l, hith asset accumulation playing a more central role.

-.:rngc.s

of

s.
2.

A DY};Af!IC MACRO MODEL

We consider a small open economy in which private agents may
hold as assets domestic money, domestic bonds, and foreign bonds, all of
-..hich, "We assume, they regard as components of their net weal th.
two assets are denominated in· domestic currency,

foreign currency.

The first

and the third in

Thus, at any moment, nri vate nominal weal th W

is given by
(2.1)

"·here M denotes the supply of domestic money (Khich we assume is held only
domestically), Ad th~ number of domestic bonds held domestically, Bd the
number of foreign bonds held domestically, Eis the spot rate measured
as the price of a unit of foreign exchange in tenns of domestic currency.
We assume that there is no perceived risk of default on domestic or
foreign bonds so that CIP obtains

R

R*

=

F,

+

(2.2)

Since our analysis is in continuous time,

F measures the

instantaneous rate of fon~ard premium on foreign exchange and is defined
formally by
F(t)

= lim

[

Ef(t,t+h) - E(t)l
hE (t)

(2. 3)

h-+O

f
where E (t, t+h) is the price at time t of one unit of foreign exchange in

period t+h.

Since as the time unit h-+O, the spot and fan-Jard rates must

converge, E(t)

=

Ef(t, t), in which case the limit in (2.3) may be expressed

by the following partial derivative
f

f

F(t) = E (t, t)/E (t, t).
2
Since domestic and covered foreign bonds are perfect subs ti tut es we
shall assume that all domestic bonds are held domestically.

Thus we let

Ad= A, where A denotes the total supply of domestic bonds.

We allow Bd to

assume negative values "When domestic agents issue liabilities denominated
in foreign currency.

Individuals consume both traded and nontraded goods, which are
imperfect substitutes.

Perfect goods arbitrage ensures that the prices

of traded goods are detemined by the law of one price.

We assume that

because of long tenn contracts, the prices of nontraded goods at any
instant are fixed at P, say.

An index of the domestic cost of

living C is therefore
0 < o < 1

(2.4)

where o denotes the share of nontraded goods in consumption and P* is
the exogenously given foreign price level (i.e. the foreign price of traded
goods).

For notational siraplici ty we set P* = 1.
We assu::ne a del:land for money function of the fonn

½>

M -- L(Y, R, H)
C

0,

L

< 0,

(2. 5)

R =

Khere Y is real income,assumed to be fixed, and H

= W/C

denotes real wealth.

Note that we have deflated by C, reflecting the fact that real wealth
depends upon the price of both traded and nontraded goods in accordance

with their shares in consumption.
Together, equations (2.1), (2,2), (2.4) and (2.5) determine, at any
moment, equilibrium values of C, R, F, and Was functions of P, E, A, Bd, M,
and the exogenous foreign variables R*

and P*.

he noh· turn to the d)11a..r.iic eouations of the system.
fon,·ard market equilibrium.

First, consider

Participation in the fon;ard market may be for

two reasons, speculation and arb{trage. 6

We assume that the real demand

for speculative foreign exchange fon-.,ard, denoted by J , is an increasing
function of the expected rate of return on speculation, given by the difference
bcthcen the expected rate of depreciation of the domestic currency (t/E)e
the fon~ard premium F.

and

We shall assume expectations are realized on average.

Since he suppress stochastic elements in our model this is equivalent to
·
e
assuming perfect foresight, so that (E/E)

=

•
7
E/E.
Fon--ard market equi 1i bri uJJ

requires that J equal the supply of foreign exchange forward for arbitrage;
i.e., that ,,hi ch 1s sold to cover domestic holdings of foreign hands:

J::;I.)

J::;

c

J'

J (- - F)

=

E

>
=

o.

(2 .6)

As shoKn by previou s authors , J embodie s attitude s to risk taking.

In

particu lar, J' varies inversel y with the degree of risk aversion , with

J'

➔

in the limiting case of risk neutral ity, when DIP obtains .

00

By appropr iate choice of units, the steady- state price of nontrade d
to the dor:1estic price of traded goods.

goods can be equated

is

that the price of nontrade d goods

We assume

determin ed by long tenn contrac ts,

so that the nontrade d goods price cannot jump

instanta neously to its

equilibr illiil level, but can adjust only continuo usly over time, as contrac ts
This adjustm ent is specifie d by the relation ship

expire.

P

=

G' > 0,

G(E/P)

(2. 7;

G(l) = 0,

The rate of change in the supply of domestic assets is determin ed
by the goveI11J11ent budget constra int

.

.

(2.

M +A= PGd + EGm - T + RA - g

s:

where Gd and Gm represen t real governm ent expendi tures on nontrade d and
traded goods respect ively, and T denotes nominal tax revenue s.

The rate of

change in the domesti c holdings of foreign assets is equal to the balance
of payment s on current account
EBd = EX(.) - EG

m

+

R*EBd

=b

where X(.) denotes real net exports of the private sector.
Togethe r with an assumpt ion about how the governm ent finances its
expendi tures, equation s (2.6), (2. 7), (2,8) and (2.9) determin e the evolutio n
of E, P, A, M, and Bd.

From the descrip tion of the system it might appear

that the spot rate Eis constrai ned always to move continuo usly.
not so.

This is

Because of the assumpt ion of perfect foresigh t embodied in (2.6),

the dynamic s will generall y involve (at least) one unstable root.

Followin g

the rationa l expecta tions methodo logy, this root may be elir:1ina ted by allo~ing ti
exchange: rate to undergo an endogen ously determin ed initial jur:1p at points
where the system is subject to an exogeno us disturba nce.
this are: river, in Sccti0ns

--1

anc.l S he low.

Simple examplc5 of

Define total nominal bond holdings Bas

Adding (2.8) and (2.9) and using the CIP condition (2.2), we obtain

M+ B

=

PG

d

(2.lC

- T +EX+ RB+ (t/E - F)EBd.

From this equation it is evident that in general the evolution of the system
depends upon the breakdown

Thus,

of B between domestic and foreign bonds.

for e.\ample, if M = O (the deficit is bond-financed), E, P and B cannot assume
·d
their steady state values unless B =A= O;

that is,unless both the government

deficit (g) and the balance of payments on current account (b) are zero.
And the s~~e applies in the case of money financing.
Consider, hoh'c\·er, the liniting case in which J' (.)

➔

00 ,

i.e. the

speculati ,.-c de;:iand for foreign exchange forward becomes infinitely elastic.
In order for the speculative demand to remain bounded, (1.2) must hold.
In this case (2.2) and (2.6) reduce to the UIP condition (1.3), so that (2.10)
becomes
(2.10

M + B = PGd - T +EX+ RB.

\\'riting (2.1) as
H

=

(2.1

(M + B)/C

equations (2,1'), (2.4), (1,3), (2,5), (2,7), (2,10') constitute a dynamic
system in \,·hich A and Bd do not appear (assuming of course that A and Bd do
not enter separately in the specifications of Gd, Gm' T, or X).
government deficit is bond-financed M = O.

The dynamics de;,end

If the
only upon

the sur' of the government deficit and the current account deficit (g
and not the separate components,
B

=

E = P

=

0.

+

b)

Steady state now only requires that

The government may sustain a deficit in steady state as lon 6

as it is offset by a current account deficit of equal size, since the steady
•

state requirement B

=

.

·d

0 is equivalent to A= -EB .

With money financing,

both co~poncnts must be zero.
A special case widely adopted in the literature, and therefore of
importance, arises if the demand for mon~weal th II.

Consider first the limiting a~

; assumed to be independent of real
:ion of infinitely elastic

9.
If the governm ent defici t is bond-f inance d, the

specula tive- b;:..lances.

dynarai cs of P and E become indepen dent of g

+

b and these variab les can attain

lated
steady -state cqui librium with· i-·eal th, in the form of bonds, being accumu
With a money- finance d defici t, steady state for E and P require s

indefi nitely. 8

only that the governr..ent defici t be zero;

the curren t accoun t balanc e can be

lating)
non-ze ro, with domest ic residen ts contin ually accumu lating (or decumu
In the genera l case \\here J • is finite, no variab le can be in

foreign bonds.

attain stead;
steady state unless g=b=O. However, u.."'lder bond financi ng E and P can
state

with only b = 0, provide d one imposes the additi onal.r estrict ion

that net exports be indepen dent of H.

9

In formul ating dyna,:;ic reacro models such as the one above, it is citen
convc:- iient to specify real savings behavi our directl y.

Thus, if one

postula t12s
(2 .11

H = S (.)

inflow
it follo~s froc (2.1), (2,8), and (2.11) that the rate of net capita l
E~d

can be derived as

d·
.
= CS(.) + W[cSP/P + (1-6)E/ E] - BE - [PGd + EGm] + T - RA.

(2.12

By co~par ing (2.9) and (2.12) it is clear that S(.) and X(.) cannot be
specif ie2 indepen dently.
These obser,a tions about the approp riate specif ication of dynamic
various
mcdels under perfec t capital mobili ty have importa nt implic ations for
models appeari ng

in the literat ure.

First, the model of exchang e rate

ignores
dynami cs introd\..iced ty Dornbusch (1976) and studied by other authors
cs of the
the balanc e of pay,,!ents and savings behavi our in analyz ing the dynami
exchang e rate.

This is possib le only because they assume UIP and that there

arc no asset supply effects on money dc'.lland,

Under the less restric tive

the
conditi on of Cl~, howeve r, the dynamic adjustm ent of the exchang e ratc,on

10.

ly determ ined, even
one hand, and asset accu.'11Ulation,on the other ,are joint
.
in the absen ce of wealt h effec ts in the demand for money
a well known resul t of ~~nde ll (1968 ) is that a gover nment

Secon d,

economy under
defic it has no effec t on the stead y state of a small open
nge rates .
condi tions of perfe ct capit al mobi lity and flexib le excha

This

chang e in the defic it
is certa inly true under the condi tions of UIP when any
it, leavin g the
will be offse t by a chang e in the curre nt accou nt defic
d
However, it is not gener ally true under CIP, when indee

system uncha nged.

stead y state requi res 1:he defic it to be zero.
3.

STEADY -STAT E PROPERTIES

ption of UIP
t-lodels of excha nge rate deten ninat ion based on the assum
follow ing stead y-sta te
and the absen ce of an ongoi ng infla tion yield the
relati onsh ip
(3.1

R = R*

varia ble.
where - is used to denot e the stead y-sta te value of a

Thus the

rate, from which we
dome stic inter est rate is comp letely tied to the world
imme diatel y infer :
(i)

Chang es in the foreig n inter est rate yield equal
chang es in the dome stic inter est rate;

(ii)

the

da□ cstic

inter est rate is indep enden t of the suppl y

of do~es tic money or dome stic bonds .
ficati on
Other stead y-sta te prope rties depen d upon the polic y speci
and the dynamic system so gener ated.
. gs
savin

If one adopt s the frequ ently postu lated

, ()
. n-~
f unctio
(3.2

- !-l)

S = ¢(H(Y , R*)

where ll is some long-TUn dcsiT ed level of real wealt h,

the stead y-sta te

monet ary cquil ibriuD rclati ons~ ip bccc~ cs
M
E --

LrY
l

'

n*
'
I\

jl(V
•
•

,

R*-))· •

From this equat ion, two furth er propo sition s foll01-,:

(3.2

11.

(iii)

A given change in the domestic money supply leads
to a proportionate change in the exchange rate;

(iv)

the exchange rate is independent of the supply of
domestic bonds.

None of properties (i) - (iv) characterizes the steady state of the model
presented in Section 2, except in the limiting case when the speculative
demand for foreign exchange fornard is perfectly elastic.

11

1\'c adopt the savings function (3. 2) and ass tune, for simpiici ty and

-

without e~sential loss of ~enerality, that His exogenous and independent
cf the interest rate. The steady state of the model presented in Section 2
.
.
.
·d

is attained 1,hen

E

=

P = A = M = B

= 0.

Imposing these conditions yields

the equations

-

H =

(3. 4,

-

E

R = R*
M

--

L(Y,

E

-d

B

-

-

(3. 41

+ F

- fi)
R,

(3.4<

= J (-F)

E(Gd

+

Gm) - T

(3. 4c

+RA=

O.

(3.4E

-

-

-d

-

Given H, these five equations involve the 7 variables, !-.1, A, B , E, R, ~, T.
we shall assume initially that the monetarv authorities peg M =Mand
A= A, continu,usly adjusting T to balance t:1c budget.
Thus M, A, along with R*, may be treated as exogenous parameters.
Totally differentiating the system with respect to these variables we

-

oLtain thl: fol lo;,·ing effects on the domestic interest rate R

12.

dR

A

dR
-

M

dA

Ell

dR

=

dR*
\,·here

!::. - J '~l

A)

LR (~l +

(3. St

> 0

J'M
[I

(3.53

< 0

{: 01

(3.Sc

> 0.

Thus a once-and-fo r-all increase in the domestic money supply reduces the
steady-stat e ~ornestic interest rate, while an increase in the doQestic supply
of bonds increases it.

An

increase in the foreign interest rate leads to a

reduction in the fon-:ard premitL'1l, causing the domestic interest rate to rise by
a less than proportiona l amollllt.

In the limiting case v,·hen J

1

-+=,

the response

becomes proportiona l and in this extreme case changes in Mand A have no
effect on R.

Thus, unless speculators are risk neutral or perceive no

exchange risk, the domestic interest rate is not totally determined by the
interest rate abroad and responds to domestic asset supplies in the manner
indicated.

Multiplying (3, 53.) by !-1 ar,d (3. Sb) by A and SlL"'7l:::ing
expression equal to zero.

yields an

Thus an increase in the do~estic money supply

accompanied by a proportioila l increase in the domestic bond supply is
neutral in its effect on the steady-stat e domestic interest rate.

Changes in Mand A have the following proportiona l effects on the
steady-stat e ~pot rate E
~l = f:l(J ' - LR) {
[I

E

dE

dA

A
E

=

{

>

0

<

1

>

0

<

1

(3. 6,

(3. 6

Both elJstic ities are positiv e and less than one, \,hile surr;;ning to
unity.

Tnus, contrar y to propos itions (iii) and (iv), an increas e in the

e
money supply leads to a less than propor tional increas e in the exchang
rate, while the supply of domest ic bonds also affects the exchang e rate.
er leads t
Propor tional increas es in the supplie s of the two nomina l assets togeth
propor tional increas es in the exchang e rate and the domest ic price level.
As J•~, (3.6a) tends to unity

and (3.6b) tends to zero.

Thus only in

this limitin g case do propos itions (iii) and (iv) hold.
Fiscal policy involve s changin g

A. A well-kn mm propos ition of

t
~hmdel l (1963) and Fleming (1962) is that under flexibl e rates and perfec
small
capita l nobili ty fiscal policy has no effect on the steady state of a
open econo::-,y.

It is eviden t from our analys is that again for this result

to apply, perfec t capita l mobili ty must be interpr eted to mean that UIP
~.
obtain s; i.e. thatfor eign exchang e specula tion require s no risk premilL
The same genera l charac teristi cs of the steady state describ ed by
for
(3. 4a) - (3. 4e) obtain under alterna tive policy specif ication s. If,
exampi e, tax receip ts are held at a constan t real level, say , , and the
governr.1ent finance s its defici t with bonds, the steady -state relatio ns
(3.4a) - (3.4e) will continu e to dcter~i ne the steady -state values of

-d, ~,
f\.
B

F-· ,

E- , an d;:·,.

~ow, howeve r, (3.4e) require s the stock of docest ic

-

-

bonds to adjust in propor tion to the exchang e rate, since T = E~.

Under

UIP propos itions (i) and (iv) still obtain but if UIP does not hold these
propos iti8ns will be violate d as before.

The respon ses of Rand E to

genera lly
changes in R* and M can be calcula ted (A is now endoge nous) and will
differ from the expres sions given in (3.5), (3.6) above because of the
differe nce in policy specif ication .
\\'c

conclud e this discuss ion \,·ith a further cor:unent on (3.Sc), which

,
asse:rts that an incrcJs e in R* leads to a fall in the for.-:ard prcr.1ium
st rate.
thereby leading to a less than propor tionate rise in the domest ic intere
This result tur.1s out to depend upon the specifi cation of the savings

14.

function and under an alternati ve specifica tion the domestic interest
To illustrat e this,

rate may actually increase r:o:re than proportio nately.

suppose that instead of specifyin g a savings function as we have done,
we specify a net e:x-port function

X' > 0.

X = X(E/P)

Tne steady state of the system now consists of (3.4a) - (3.4e), together
with the steady state of (2. 9)
X(l) - G

-d

m

E=

Since in steady st:ite

(3. 4:f

= 0.

+ R*B

P, \ is no,, fixed.

H is no~,· endogenou s
-d

and, giYen -~ and M, is determine d together with B ,

Consider an increase in R*.

E, R,

F, and

f.

Since in steady state X - Gm is

inde:rende nt of R* it fol loKs from (3. 4f) that in order for the balance cf
payments on current account to remain in equilibriu m, Bd must fall.

If

-d
B

falls, fon,ard market equilibriu m condition (3.4d) requires the fon·ard
prer.::iun to rise, in which case the CIP condition (3.4b) implies arr.ore than
proportio nate increase in the domestic interest rate.
4.

PROPORTIO~AL I~CREASES I!\ HO;\EY A..f\D

EXCHA.\GE RA.TE DY.\AMICS:

DO~~STIC BO~D SUPPLIES

\\'e now consider an economy in Khich steady state is disturbed by
once-and -fo:--all increases in the money supply and doI'.lestic bond supply
of equal proportio n

and

the behaviour of the exchange rate

exasine

For convenien ce,we assume

during its transitio n to the new steady state.

a log-linea r version of the model developed in Section 2.

Other simplific ations

thedynam ic analysis, but also to make

are introduce d not only to expedite

our results as co~parabl e as possible with the existing literatur e.
Following , for example, Driskill (1980), we take the following

lot-linea r approxima tion to ~calth
h =

µ a + µ

1

2

(e+bd)

+

(1-µ -µ

1

2

)m - c

=_

(4. 1 J

w-c

where .., 1 is the share of domestic bonds in domestic wealth and

1,1

2

is the

15.

share of foreign bonds.
other variable s let x

-

We denote r= R - R,
0

_ Q.n

f = F - F

o.

and for all

X - tn X , where for any variable Z0 denotes
0

the value of Zin the initial steady state.

Thus xis the percenta ge

deviatio n in X from its initial steady state val~e.
Assumin g that the foreign interes t rate remains unchang ed at R*, the
interes t rate parity conditio n (express ed in deviatio n form) is
(4. 2)

r = f
while the price index now becomes

( 4. 3)

c =op+ (1-o)e.
Follm,·jn g Dornbusc h (1976), Gray and Turnovsk y (197Sa) and \'iilson
ion
(1979) i--e r:-.ake the assllii1pt ion that income remains constan t, an asst.:mpt
that

has been shoh-n to be of some importan ce for exchange rate dy.iar.ii cs.

Thus an approxim ation to money market equilibr ium is given by

m- c

=

-a 1 r +ah
. 2

Cl.

l.

(4. 4)

> 0

=

Imposing the assumpti on of perfect foresigh t, the log-line ar
approxim ation to the conditio n for forward market equilibr ium becomes

e

+ b

d

(4. 5)

y ; 0

- c = y(e - f)

\•;here y is t:-ie elastici ty of specula tive demand for foreign exchang e forward
with resp2ct to the risk pre,1ium .
aversion with y

➔

00

y varies inversel v h·ith the degree of risk

as risk neutral ity is approach ed.

The adjustm ent of

prices is specifie d by l2

p = 8(e

- p)

e

>

o.

(4, 6)

f..s disc.c.1ss ed in Section 2, under the more general assumpt ions \-.:e
make about specula tive behavio ur

the dynamic s of exchange rates and

domestic prices are interdep endent with those of assets.

In order to keep

the analysi s tractab le, the simples t possible assumpt ions "ill be made hith
respect to the dy-namics of asset accumul ation,

First, we assume that the

fiscal authori ty adjusts governm ent expendi ture and taxes to ensure that

3

16.
balanced budget obtains continuously.

Thus, except at the moment when

A = ii

the monetary disturbance is introduced,

= 0.

Second, \,e assume that

individuals adjust their holdings of foreign bonds toi-.·ards their steadystate level, i.e.
·d
d
b = -pb = p(B - B)

( 4. 7)

p > 0.

0

The forms of X(.) and S(.) implied by (4.7) may be derived from (2.9)
and (2 .12) above.

Portfolio adjustment costs may provide some justification

for the accumulation equation (4.7).

But the main advantage cf this formulaticr.

for our purposes is its tractability;

together ~ith the balanced budget

assu~ption it r.iinirnizes the role of asset accu~ulation dyn~~ic:s, thus
sir.ipl i fying our analysis enorri:iously.
Equations (4.1) to (4,7) constitute a conplete dyna-nic system.
Equations (4.1) through (4.4) determine at any moment values of h, c, r,
and f as functions of e, p, and b a, \\hose dynamic behaviour is described

by equations (4.5) through (4,7).
For the special case in Khich
demand for money) and y

➔ ro

a

2

= 0

(zero wealth effects in the

(currency speculation requires no risk premium)

the model outlined in equations (4.1) to (4.7) reduces in essence to the
one examined by Dornbusch (1976) et al.
w}1en y

➔

00

,

As we ncntioned in Section 2,

exchange rate dynar.1ics are independent of Bd and A.

For this

re2.son these earlier studies did not require any assmr.ptions about the
bond-fi:?anc:ed co;:;po:1ent of the government deficit or about ?avings behaviour.
Dornbusch et al. consider the effects of a once-and-for-al 1 change
1n the money supply on the path of the exchange rate and price level,
we pointed out :i.n Section 3, in the special case they consider

As

the stead:.J

state effect of such a change is a proportional change in the exchange rate
and the price level, Kith the domestic interest rate remaininE unchanged,
□ aintain

this lo~g-run neutrality in our more general rnodel

1

To

~he change in

the 1i1,mcy supply must be accc,rnpanied by a proportional change in the supply of

17.
This policy is a once and for all transfer of money and

domestic bonds.

bonds an~ is considered in this section.
Consider an initial steady state in which all variables in
equations (4.1) through (4. 7) are zero (i.e. £n X = tn X0 , etc.) and assume
that the supplies of money and domestic bonds are both increased once-andfor-all by~ per cent. 13

e = p =~=;,while

In the new steady state,

all other variables return to their initial (zero) levels. In particular,
.
-d
it is important to note that b = 0, i.e.,there is no change in the n~~ber
of foreign bonds held in the new steady state.
·d

b

=

b

d

Hence, by eq'...lation (4.7),

= 0 throughout the transition, so that this equation can be ignored.

14

Thus, given the assu:::1ptions \~e have ;:iade, the dynamics can be :reduced
to a consideration of~ and~
we may

Rearranging (4.5) and recalling (4.6)

\\Ti te

e = f +

o(e -

(4 .s

p)

y

( 4. 6

p = 8(e - p)

and using equations (4.1) through (4.4) to solve for f, we obtain the
follmiing second order system of differential equations in e and p

(4. 8

0

al - -y

0

- +
y

+

-[1 - a2(1-~2)]n
k -

al

where rn defining h

~here

c

=

n

=

i-.·e

have used the fact that da = dm = m.

Letting

m, ~e m2y write the non-homogeneous svstem (4.8) 1n hornofcneous

form
( 4. _.

18.

which has as its solution

m+

e(t) =

A exp(A t)
1
1
A.-a

p(t) = m + A

1

l

a

1

+

A exp(A t)
2
2

(4.9

A -a
2 1

(4.9

exp(A t) + A - - exp(.\ t)
2
2 a
1

2

2

where A , A , are the solutions to the characteristic equation of (4.8')

2

1

(4.1
From the definitions of a
a

l

+ a

2

=

and a we observe
2
1
··
1-a 2 + a 21--2

(4 .1

> 0

Ct

1
This condition ·,,ill certainiy be met if the

v,eal th el2.stici ty of the der.1and for money does not exceed -:.:ni ty, a can di ticn

that

see~s

reasonable to impose.

Thus (4.11) implies that the system

(4.8') :ias rJne neg2.tive and o::-le positive eigenvalue, .....-hich we shall identify

as

)_

1

<

0,

A~> 0, respectively.
.,_

To corr:plete the solution requires the deterrd.nation of the arbitrary
constants A , A2"
1

First, we shali impose the requirement that the system

converges to its steady state, i.e. 15

lim e(t) = e;
t~

lim p(t) = p.
t~

For this to be so the coefficient of the unstable root A
constant is obtained from an initial condition.

2

= 0.

The other

In keeping with the literature

on exchange rate dynamics, \,e assurne that, 1,hile discontinuous junps in the
exchange ra:e are possible, the price of nontraded goods is constrained to
move cont inuo 1-sly.

The fact that the exchange rate is deternined by vir-::ually

continuous trading in an auction market while the prices of nontraded goods
are determined mainly by a large nu;1ber of longer-term contracts makes this
assumption plausible.

1hus, imposing the condition thal p sta::-t fror:: its

initiai stc::.1dy state value of zero, i.e., that
A -a
1 1
+ m = o,
p(o) = Al
a2
impl

it·\

that

I
I
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(4.12

Substitut ing the values for A1 , A2 into (4.9a), (4.9b), recalling
that e = p = m, yields the following solutions for the exchange rate and
price of nontraded goods
(4.13.

Consider noh·

the value of the exchange rate ir.u11ediately after the increase

in the r..oney and bond supplies at t = O.

This value, denotC'd by e(o+)

is giYen by
( 4 .14

It can be establish ed from (4.10) thatthe smaller root Al satisfies

so that e(o+) ~ e

c= m)

as a

2

~

0

or,equiva lently,as
( 4. 15

The exchange rate overshoot s or undershoo ts its new steadyvalue

state

as e(o+) ~

m and

(4.15) provides a simple criterion for

In the limiting case of the

deter,:-,ini ng 1,·hich of these two cases occurs.
Dornbusch nodel, a,= 0, y

➔

00

'

ensuring that overshoot ing takes place.

Nore generally , a reduction in the wealth elasticit y of the demand for
money

u

2

or an increase in the elasticit y of speculati on y raises the likelihooc

of overshoot ingffc furthermo re, different iating
in~icatcs that as long as

a

2

<

l, de(o+)/dy

>

e(o+) with respect toy
O;

an increase in the elasticit y

of specuJ2ti on raises the impact effect on the exchange rate of a change in
nominal asset supplies.

20.

The phenomenon of oversh ooting has been cited as a reason for the
observe d volati lity of exchang e r~tes;

changes in asset supplie s create

movements in exchang e rates \,·hich exagge rate the implic ations of these
change s for steady state.

Accord ing to this interp retatio n, specul ation
As risk aversio n on the

acts to destab ilize the foreign exchang e market .

part of specul ators falls, making the supply of specul ative funds more
elastic , the exchang e rate reacts more sharply to change s in asset
' .,

supplie s. • ·

To underst and this result observe that since the prices of nontrad ed
,
goods are sticky, changes in nomina l asset supplie s consti tute, on impact
changes in real asset supplie s.

The exchang e rate and intere st rate must

' restore asset market equilib rium.
adjust to

An

increa se in the nomina l

supplie s of money and domest ic bonds increas e both the supply of and
denand for r.ioney, the second via a ,,·cal th effect .
a

2

<

Taking the likely case

1, the net impact on the money market is to create an excess supply.

To mainta in equilib rium in the money market during the adjustm ent period
require s a lower domest ic intere st rate, \,·hich in turn require s a lo,\er
fon,·ard pre;.1iurn on foreign exchan ge, f.
~ben specul ation is perfec tly elastic , f

=

e.

In this case, a

lo,,·er d::i:;-1estic interes t rate require s a continu ous c;-;;y,ee:_::.-:::io,,
during t~e adjust~ ent period .

(c

<

O)

If the exchang e rate is to apprec iate to its

ne1-:, higher , steady -state value it v.,ust initial ly deprec iate to a value
c._:),:;ve

e;

that is, the exchang e rate must oversh oot.

ll°he:r. specul ation is less than perfec tly elastic , (y

<

00 ) ,

howeve r,

rium by
an exch;mg 2 rate deprec iation also impinge s on fon,·ard market equilib
re\'alui ng domest ic holding s of foreign bonds.

This revalu ation creates an

fonvar<l
excess sup11ly of foreign exchang e fon,ard 1,hich acts to bid <lm~11 the
pre:r:1ium on foreign exchang e f.

If the drop in f rc::..1ir ed to restore

forward w.arket equilibrium exceeds the drop required to restore money
market equilibrium, then a continuous depreciatior.
maintain equi 1 ibriwn in both markets.

(e

>

0) is needed to

For this continuous depreciation

to converge to the new steadi state exchange rate, the depreciation on
impact must be 1 ess than the ste:1dy state depreciation;

that is, undershooting

of the exchange rate must occur.
S.

EXCHA\GE RATE DY~A,\lICS:

INCREASE IN J-K)NEY SUPPLY ALO:(E

In section 4 1s·e analyzed a change in nominal asset supplies wh.;.ch
was neutral in the sense that it generated proportional changes in the
steady-state do;.1estic price level and exchange rate \dth no change in the
steady-state domestic interest rate.

Using the model of Section 4, consider

r.ci, a once-and-for-a ll change in the money supply alone of iii per cent.

Starting from initial zero levels, the effects on the steady-state
exchange r2.te, price level, and fon,·ard premium are given by

< rn

(5 .1,

(S .11

respectjvely, while do~estic holdings of foreign bonds change by

-d

b

=

> 0

Thus an increase in the money supply leads to a less than proportional
increase in the exchange rate, accompanied by a reduction ir. the forward
premium, 1,·hi le the number of foreign bonds held in steady state increases.
The economy Gust therefore on average run a current account surplus during
the transi:'.~n betw~e~ steady states.
the noncy "do:::cstic DC;:_

The reason is that the increase in

raises the price level.

·]v
3

The real value of outstanding

reduced and a larger number of foreign bonds are required

(5. 1 c

to mainta5n real wealth at H.
111e dynamic s of the system can be describe d by the differe ntial

equation s
e

e

(5.2

0

0

0

~here a 1 and a 2

-p

are defined as before,

-d

is disturbe d by the policy, the dynar,,ic s of :foreign

~~ote th2t because b

bond accu~ul ation nust no~ be taken into account .

Solving (5.2) along ~ith the termina l conditio n

=e =

lirn e(t)

lirn p(t)

=p

t-+=

and the i;-ii tial conditio ns
p(o)

=

0,

vields

(\ -a 'i
p (t)

=

I

]

1i

(5.:

l---1 A expC::, t) 1
1
cl 2 j

(5.:
hhcrc

I ]

;:md

/>.2

a-,,,. as defined in Section 1 and
a_b-d G

Al

-

-~

I
I .r r+.) ,I Cr,+t- 2 .)
1, '
\'

-

l

r

a2
). 1

- al

~d
~
Substituting forA 1 ,p, and b into (S.Sa) at time t = 0,

the

criterion for the initial overshooting or undersh00ting of the exchange
rate is given by the expression

(5. 6)

This is a rather complicated function of the underlying parameters and

i·

does not appear that the phenomenon can be characterized by any simple
conditicn.

Thus,during the transition between steady states the economy

runs a current acco1:nt s:;.,2r;::-us, while either

e>

0 or e

<

0 is possible.

Any relationship between the direction of the movement of the exchange rate
and the current account may therefore exist.
6.

CO\CLUSIO::

The assUTJption that speculative foreign exchange positions require
a risk premiur:1 has iGplications for a number of propositions about open
economies \,·i th flexible exchange rates.

In particular, propositions about

the impotence of fiscal policy and the equality in steady state between
domestjc and foreign interest rates based on the assumption of perfect capital
mobility require the strong version of this assumption -- uncovered interest
rate pari t:: -- to h0ld.

They do not obtain if only the \,·cakcr assur::ption

of covered interest rate parity holds.
Furthermore, introducing risk aversion along
wealth effec:s

in the demand

exchange rate dynamics.

f6r money has

hi th

imclications

for

It tends to reduce the presumption of overshooting

of the exchange rate in response to monetary disturbances, both the likelihood
that it happens at all &nd the 3mo~nt by which it occurs if it does occur.
To the extent that the major sources of disturbances are changes in nominal
asset suppl1es, factors encouraging currency speculation, such as an increase
in the n1mber of speculators, arc likely to reduce the overall risk aversion
exhibited hy the market and increase the volatility of the exchange rates.
In tl1is sense spccul~tors destabilize the raarkct.

ruu1.,vlc.: :>

1.

Other authors draw the distinct ion between perfect capital mobility
bet\,een cotmt ries and perfect subs ti tutabi Ii ty between dornesti c and
foreign bonds. The forwer term correspo nds to the weaker definiti on
of CIP, hhile the latter describ es the stronge r definiti on of UIP:
see Fran~:el (1981).

2.

Steady states possessi ng varying degrees of station arity are familiar
from the literatu re; see, e.g., Dornbusc h (1976), Turnovs ky (1977).

3.

This provosi tion is of course based on the presur-,p tion that the h'Orld
is not charact eri:ed by conditio ns of secular inflatio n, an ~ssu~pti on
r.iade thro:1gh out this a.nalys is. Under secularl y inflatio nary conditio ns,
the steady- state relation ship between the domestic and foreign interes t
rates under UI? is R = R* + e, hhere e is the secular rate of inflatio n.
It is clear that through e domesti c policies =re able to influenc e the
domestic nominal rate of interes t even if UIP obtains .

4.

This r;.>sult has also been obtained by Harris and Purvis (1979).

5.

;f\.' st::css that this state::-,e nt refers to ::-,odels based on sir:iilar assuni:;-,:
ic ~s

to those ~e stall introduc e. A good deal of attentio n has been de¥ot~d
in the j :i tcn;.ture to establis hing the robustne ss of the 01:ersho oting
phenor::e non ;1nd r:any r.iodels in i-·hi ch it does not occur TIO\, exist. Factor
.3
tending to elir.iina te o\·ersho oting, but ;~ot incorpo rated in our analysis
include:
(i) variaoie output,
(i 1.) instanta neous price adj ustr:ient ,
(iii) sufficie ntly 101, substit utabilit y beh;een domesti c and foreign
securit ies.
6.

1·;e find it analytic ally conveni ent to separate fonsard market particip
ation

into pure specula tion and pure arbitrag e.
We implici tly treat the
acquisi tion of an amo:..i:1t of :;,;::~:r.:eY'2c. foreign bonds as cor::;,inir :g a co:;erec.
investr;i er.t of x in foreign bonJ.s and a specu:c:t -:ve pc~r>e:r:a.se of foreign
curre:::c: y for,,·ard in a;r.cunt x.
In a portfoli o r:-,odel of foreign investme nt we
identify a third r.10tive for particip ating in 1the fon,ard market as hedging
against dorr:estic inflatio n.
Fon,ard position s for hedging purpose s depend
upon the relative variabi lity of the domestic and foreign price levels
and
do not respc,nd to the Y3riablc s we are concerne d 1-:i th here.
Thus 1,e may
treat the forward position due to hedging as a constan t absorbed in Jt;
see Eaton ar.d Tumovs~ :y (1980;.
1.

The notiCJ:: of a ''risk premiurr: " on fon,ard exchange in a non-sto chastic
r,odc l is so;:;n:ha t a1d~h·ard, al though no more so than having differen t rates
of re:tur;1 C'n c!iffercn t securit ies as is cor:::.:onp lacc in con-vent ional determi
nistic
r;iacrocc o,.o;;.ics .
Our r.:ain reason for doing this is to preserve analytic al
t ractabi l i t.y and also to enable us to preserve compara bi 1 i ty 1..-i th the
£,.xistin,. : literatu re-, 1-.-hich is also determi nistic. One inter;irc t2.tion of
o:..ir apnro2.ch ;,: t" ~ :, 11~_1: ,.•.·;:ecta tions :o.:-c (•c. :',\";::-~:,;t:· ,~:-,-~ i: 1: , ~ . '"~·,:C'rth
eless
tt:c r~<.'..;:···n.: ---;-,.: :-::.:!~·-_:-:.:--:- :·: ::::~, th'2 r1c=s:nitl1:l~.' 0~ ·.. ~~ct·~·.- ill effect
the
fu,:~::ic.; : _. ~t·,.· r:u~C':! ::i..:c ; :i~:c.-sk y (l~~::;:J_;.

8.

To see this, observe that \,ith bond financing the d)T1ar:1ics of E, P involve:
only equations (2.4), (1.3), (2.S) and (2. 7). With a money-financed deficit
equation (2.8), \,·jth A= 0, r.i:.ist be considered as well. The fact that bond
accumulation may continue j11 steady state in the absence of wealth effects
in relevant demand ftmctions is familiar from the simple IS-LM model; see
e.g. Turnovsky (1977, Chapter 4).

9.

Another policy worth notinr, is the balanced budget. As long as H enters
the money der:and function, steady state always requires g = b = O;
irrespective of the elasticity of the speculative derr:and for fon,·ard
exchange ~ith respect to the risk premium. The same applies if Lis
independent of H, as long as J' is finite. The limiting case of infinitely
elastic speculation, steady state requires only that g = 0.

)0.

This type of specification is used, for example, by Tobin a."1d Buiter (1976)
for a closed economy.

11.

Even in this li~iting case, propositions (iii) and (iv) do not nece~~ar~ly
hold under altcrnati ve, plausible specifications of asset supply and a~ set
accu::1;..ilation beha\·ior. Con.sider the case in \,·hich taxes are ;,,aintaine( at
If the govern:ient deficit is c..:.;.,::.::-fin·.nced
a constant le·;el in re:1i tems.
and if c:he: cc·:::and for ;;-,ency is ir.dependent c,f H pTOpositions (iii) and (iv)
Ho1s·ever, if the deficit is mone2-financed an increase in
do still hold.
the stock cf dor:iestic bonds ca~ses a proportionate change in E, which
through the deficit leads to an eventual proportionate change in M. This
contradicts proposition (iv), ~hile the causality of (iii) is reversed.
\\"i th a bal &.need budget the exchange rate is homogeneous of degree one in
money c::,;,:5. dor:iestic bonds.

12.

This specification deviates slightly from that adopted by Dornbusch et al,
in \•;hich prices are assu.,-;ied to adjust in proportion to excess demand, as
a :result of which the dor:1estic interest rate appears in (4.6) as well.
Ke have chosen our specification not only for reasons of its simplicity,
but also because it follm..-s directly from a model based on long-term
contracts.

13.

In interpreting this initial steady-state in which all variables equal
zero it should be recalled that all variables are measured in deviation
form.

14.

According to our assunption about asset accu~ulation, then, a change
~hich has only no~inal effects on the steady state has no effect on the
balance of payncnts on current account during the transition. \•,'hile an
alternative specification of savings behaviour could allo~ a non-zero
curre~t account balance at any noment during the tr2nsition, the integral
of the current accou:-1t balance betheen th'O such steady states r.n;st equal
Fer instance, if the impact of debt expansic•n is to create a deficit,
zero.
the current account balance nust at some later stage be in su1~Zus before
the ne~ steady state is reached.

15.

Convergence r.ay follo,, by appealinr. to transvers2.lity conditions from
appropriate optimi:jng □ odels which, provided that the underlying utility
function satisfies suitable restrictions, ensure that price movements
remain bounded.

JG.

Allen and ~cncn (19SOJ also find that introducing wealth cff~cts 1n the
money JC'::-,0.nc.1 function c;.m reduce or reverse overshooting. Thci r model Ji f;c:Ts
sub~tantially from 0urs, ho~cvcr, especially in that it docs not assume
pc:rfi:.-c.:t fc:·c.:"ight.
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